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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s recent expansion of the federal presumption against
1
extraterritoriality in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. and Kiobel v.
2
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. has had an unexpected consequence. In many
circumstances, state law may apply abroad far more broadly than does federal
3
law. Thus, even as the Supreme Court has significantly scaled back the reach of
federal law abroad, advocates and litigators have awakened to the potential use of
state law to obtain relief in disputes occurring partially or largely outside U.S.
4
borders.

* Professor of Law, U.C. Davis School of Law. I would like to thank Anupam Chander, William S.
Dodge, Franklin Gevurtz, John Patrick Hunt, and Courtney Joslin for comments on this Article.
1. See Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877-78 (2010).
2. See generally Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
3. See Roger W. Kirby, Access to United States Courts by Purchasers of Foreign Listed Securities in the
Aftermath of Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 223, 255 (2011).
4. Donald Earl Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next Wave of Transnational
Litigation, 100 GEO. L.J. 709 (2012); see Kirby, supra note 3, at 150; See generally, e.g., Christopher A.
Whytock et al., After Kiobel–International Human Rights Litigation in State Courts and Under State Law, 3
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1 (2013); see generally Roger Alford, Kiobel Insta-Symposium: The Death of the ATS and
the Rise of Transnational Tort Litigation, http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/17/kiobel-instthe-death-of-the-ats-and-
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To be sure, personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens continue to
present obstacles for litigants wishing to adjudicate primarily foreign
5
controversies. But those who surmount these procedural hurdles are likely to
find that, at the choice-of-law stage, many state courts readily apply their own
6
law or the law of a different U.S. state to disputes with foreign elements.
Although choice-of-law methodologies vary from state to state, many states have
7
explicit preferences for forum law in close cases, and in many other
circumstances, conflicts principles may dictate the application of state law even
8
where a substantial percentage of the events involved occurred abroad. Further,
state courts rarely address the problem of extraterritoriality explicitly, and state
choice-of-law principles in general do not differentiate between sister-state and
9
foreign-nation law. These factors, in combination, make it likely that cases will
frequently arise in which courts apply state law to overseas litigants and conduct;
indeed, in many cases (most of which have attracted little fanfare), they have
10
already done so.
Thus, in the wake of Morrison and Kiobel, it appears that state law may have
11
greater extraterritorial application than federal law. This result is surely not
what anyone would have intended, much less desired. State law applied abroad
indiscriminately raises concerns similar to those present when federal law is
12
applied too broadly to foreign disputes. The use of state law in this manner has,
for example, the potential to be seen as an inappropriate projection of U.S.
13
power and to send unclear signals to those who must shape their primary

the-rise-of-transnational-tort-litigation/ (last visited July 17, 2013); see generally Svetlana Meyerzon Nagiel,
Note, An Overlooked Gateway to Victim Compensation: How States Can Provide a Forum for Human Rights
Claims, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 133 (2007).
5. See, e.g., Katherine Florey, State Law, U.S. Power, Foreign Disputes: Understanding the
Extraterritorial Effects of State Law in the Wake of Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 92 B.U. L. REV. 535,
537 (2012) (noting that plaintiffs adjudicating claims arising abroad in U.S. courts “will face challenges—most
notably, establishing the existence of personal jurisdiction over the defendants and avoiding a forum non
conveniens dismissal”).
6. Id. at 537-38.
7. See id. (“[I]n many state choice-of-law systems, bias toward the application of forum law is
common.”).
8. See, e.g., the examples given in Part III.
9. See Mathias Reimann, A New Restatement—for the International Age, 75 IND. L.J. 575, 576-77 (2000)
(explaining that the influential Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws treats foreign law and state law more
or less identically).
10. See generally Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, (2010); see generally Kiobel
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
11. Florey, supra note 5, at 537.
12. Id. at 540.
13. See id. at 571 (“When state law applies to conduct abroad, it is no less an application of U.S. law than
when federal law is applied.”); see also Doe I v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. Civ.A.01-1357(LFO), 2006 WL
516744, at *1-2 (D.D.C. Mar. 2, 2006) (describing the law of individual states as “U.S. state law” and finding
that the “interest of the United States” outweighed “Indonesia’s interest in applying its own law” in the case at
hand).
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conduct to conform to the law. Moreover, extraterritorial application of state
law raises issues of unpredictability and lack of uniformity that are present to an
even greater extent than when federal law is involved, given the differences
among states both in their decisional rules and their choice-of-law
methodologies. Because of this, to the extent that U.S. law is to be applied
15
abroad, sound reasons exist for such law to be predominantly federal.
16
Existing state choice-of-law doctrine, however, slights such considerations.
From the state perspective, state courts have little doctrinal guidance in how to
navigate the special issues that are present when an otherwise routine conflicts
17
problem involves foreign rather than sister-state law. At the same time, the
federal presumption against extraterritoriality (which has increasingly become
the standard methodology for interpreting the reach of federal law) leaves little or
no room for taking into account the possibility that state law may apply where
18
federal law does not.
This Article thus argues that, even as state-law and federal-law approaches
regarding extraterritoriality have been growing farther apart, a strong case can be
made for greater convergence. Ideally, this convergence should come from both
directions. On the one hand, the Supreme Court’s presumption against
extraterritoriality has been criticized (among other grounds) for resting on an
overly narrow and formalistic view of both congressional intent and of the proper
19
territorial scope of law. Many of these criticisms are just, and the likely
substitution of state law for federal law in similar cases provides an additional
argument against expansion of the presumption.
At the same time, the choice-of-law principles applied by state courts suffer
from an unjustifiable provinciality. The battles of the mid-twentieth century
choice-of-law “revolution”—which occurred at a time when the main task of
conflicts principles was to navigate minor differences between states—continue
to drive conflicts doctrine today in a way that constrains choice-of-law
20
development. It is time for state courts to begin considering the international
14. Those who engage in conduct abroad, in other words, may have little way of ascertaining which legal
standards should govern their behavior. See Anthony J. Colangelo, Spatial Legality, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 69, 73
(2012) (arguing that “if the state had no prescriptive jurisdiction over the conduct when the defendant engaged
in it . . . the defendant could not reasonably have expected the state’s law to apply at the time of conduct,” thus
creating potential due process problems).
15. See Florey, supra note 5, at 568-70 (discussing potential problems when federal law is supplanted by
state law abroad).
16. Id. at 569.
17. See id.
18. Id. at 552.
19. For critical views of the presumption in general and Morrison in particular, see generally, e.g.,
Genevieve Beyea, Morrison v. National Australia Bank and the Future of Extraterritorial Application of the
U.S. Securities Laws, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 537 (2011); see generally Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to
Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REV. 1019 (2011); see generally John H. Knox, A Presumption Against
Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 351 (2010).
20. Knox, supra note 19, at 361-62.
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context and taking extraterritoriality concerns seriously in cases involving
foreign elements.
This Article proceeds in four parts. In Section II, it briefly sketches the
history of the presumption against extraterritoriality and the Court’s recent
21
expansion of the scope of that doctrine in Morrison and Kiobel. Section III
discusses the contrasting picture presented by the application of state choice-of22
law to cases involving foreign elements. In Section IV, the Article then
considers the example of California—a large state with courts that hear many
cases with foreign elements—by examining cases in which California choice-oflaw methodology has dictated the application of California substantive rules to
23
conduct abroad. Finally in Section V, the Article briefly makes the case for
bringing federal and state extraterritoriality approaches into greater harmony, and
24
outlines ways in which that aim might be accomplished.
II. EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND FEDERAL LAW
The Supreme Court has always recognized that some presumptive limits
25
exist on the degree to which federal law should apply abroad. These limits are
26
not imposed by the Constitution, which does not clearly speak to the issue, but
by other principles. One such principle, rooted in international norms, was first
27
28
described by the Court in 1804. In Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, the
Court found that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the
29
law of nations if any other possible construction remains” establishing, as John
H. Knox has put it, “a presumption that federal law does not extend beyond the
30
jurisdictional limits set by international law.”
31
Charming Betsy, however, was not the last word on the matter. Subsequent
cases, such as the Court’s famous 1909 opinion in American Banana Co. v.
32
United Fruit Co., took a more narrowly territorial view of U.S. power,
suggesting that federal law would be presumed to apply only within the territory

21. See infra Part II.
22. See infra Part III.
23. See infra Part IV.
24. See infra Part V.
25. Knox, supra note 19, at 361.
26. See id. at 351 (“Congress could not, of course, exceed constitutional limits [on enacting
extraterritorial legislation], but the Supreme Court has never clarified such limits, if they exist.”).
27. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch.) 64, 118 (1804).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See Knox, supra note 19, at 352 (describing this principle as an “offshoot of the Charming Betsy
canon”).
31. See, e.g., American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909).
32. See generally id.
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of the United States. Later lower-court cases relaxed this standard and allowed
for broader application of U.S. law abroad where, for example, foreign conduct
34
had effects within the United States effects.
In a handful of cases, however, the Court applied the presumption, rooted in
American Banana Co.’s reasoning, that “legislation of Congress, unless a
contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction
35
of the United States,” or what is now referred to as the presumption against
36
extraterritoriality. Initially, the presumption applied in a narrow range of cases
37
and imposed a rather modest hurdle. In the past twenty years, however, the
38
Court has applied the presumption far more widely and strictly. In Aramco,
which launched this recent expansion, the Court relied on the presumption to
hold that Congress did not intend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
39
govern the actions of U.S. employers who employed American citizens abroad.
While the Court applied the presumption against extraterritoriality in some
40
post-Aramco cases, elsewhere it allowed for a more expansive application of
41
U.S. law abroad. But in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., the Court
seemed to bring an end to the more expansive view, suggesting that the
presumption against extraterritoriality should become the dominant framework
42
for assessing the applicability of federal law abroad. In Morrison, a class of
foreign investors sought to sue Australia’s largest bank, National Australia Bank,
43
for violations of the Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5. The case
arose out of National’s purchase of HomeSide Lending, a Florida-based

33. See id. at 357 (describing principle of adopting “in case of doubt . . . a construction of any statute as
intended to be confined in its operation and effect to the territorial limits over which the lawmaker has general
and legitimate power”).
34. See Florey, supra note 5, at 541 (noting that courts began increasingly to embrace a principle that
U.S. law applied abroad to the extent consistent with international jurisdictional norms).
35. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo,
336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)). See Knox, supra note 19, at 366-74 (describing early evolution of the presumption).
36. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248.
37. See Knox, supra note 19, at 371; see Aramco, 499 U.S. at 271; see Florey, supra note 5, at 541
(describing Court’s initial formulation of the presumption against extraterritoriality having a “limited scope”
and requiring a “lower standard” to overcome than the Charming Betsy/extra jurisdictionality presumption).
38. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 246-47.
39. Id. Congress quickly reversed this result legislatively. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102166, § 109, 105 Stat. 1071, 1077-78 (2006) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-1, 12111-12).
40. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155, 158-59 (1993); see Smith v. United States, 507 U.S.
197, 204 (1993) (finding that the Federal Tort Claims Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity did not apply to a
claim arising in Antarctica); see also Knox, supra note 19, at 375-76.
41. Most notably, in Hartford Fire Ins. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993), the Court held that the
Sherman Act applied to extraterritorial conduct that was intended to produce and did produce “some substantial
effect” in the United States. The majority did not mention the presumption against extraterritoriality; in dissent,
Justice Scalia discussed the presumption but found that it had been overcome because of “well established” case
law interpreting the Sherman Act. Id. at 813 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
42. Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2881 (2010).
43. Id. at 2875-76.
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mortgage servicer; plaintiffs alleged that National had made fraudulent
45
representations about HomeSide’s value.
The Second Circuit had dismissed the action on the basis of its venerable test
holding that Section 10(b) could be applied only when the wrongful conduct at
issue either “had a substantial effect in the United States or upon United States
46
citizens” or “occurred in the United States.” Neither of these tests, the Second
47
Circuit had found, was satisfied in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed the
dismissal, but on an entirely different ground—the presumption against
48
extraterritoriality. In doing so, the Court referred to the presumption as a
49
“longstanding principle of American law” and criticized the Second Circuit for
50
failing to rely on it in earlier securities cases. Notably, Morrison made clear that
the presumption was a matter of presumed congressional intent, a “canon of
construction . . . rather than a limit upon Congress’s power to legislate,” and that
it could be overcome by “the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly
51
expressed to give a statute extraterritorial effect.”
52
Morrison had both obvious and subtler consequences. Most obviously,
53
Morrison significantly scaled back the reach of federal securities law. More
54
broadly, by suggesting that it was error not to apply the presumption in the
securities context (where long-standing case law had applied more liberal tests),
Morrison suggested an expanded and entrenched role for the presumption against
55
extraterritoriality. And indeed, taking their cues from the Court, lower courts in
the wake of the decision applied Morrison to find that other federal statutes, such
as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), did not
56
apply abroad because the presumption had not been overcome.

44. Id.
45. Id. at 2876.
46. See id. at 2879 (quoting SEC v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 192-93 (2d Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
47. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876.
48. Invoking the presumption, the Court formulated a different test of Section 10(b)’s territorial reach,
finding that Section 10(b) applied only to cases when a “purchase or sale is made in the United States, or
involves a security listed on a domestic exchange.” Id. at 2886.
49. Id. at 2877 (citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1990)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
50. Id. at 2878.
51. Id. at 2877 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
52. See generally id.
53. See Beyea, supra note 19, at 540 (noting that Morrison “mak[es] the private cause of action
unavailable in most securities fraud cases with a significant overseas component”).
54. The Court, that is, criticized the Second Circuit for not applying the presumption, which it described
as a “principle of interpretation . . . long and often recited in our opinions.” See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878.
55. Id. at 2881.
56. See Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Industries, Inc., 631 F.3d 29, 31-32 (2d Cir. 2010) (presumption
against extraterritoriality barred suit by Cypriot company against New York-based defendants alleging various
fraudulent machinations in wresting control of a Russian oil company).
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Any lingering uncertainty about the central place of the presumption against
extraterritoriality in the Court’s interpretive framework was dispelled by the
57
Court’s 9-0 decision in the 2013 case Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. In
Kiobel, several Nigerian nationals living in the United States sued various
“Dutch, British, and Nigerian corporations . . . under the Alien Tort Statute”
(ATS), alleging that the defendants “aided and abetted the Nigerian Government
58
in committing violations of the law of nations in Nigeria” by providing food,
transportation, and money to Nigerian military forces who had beaten, raped, and
59
60
killed anti-oil protesters. In an earlier case, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Court
had held that the ATS, in addition to granting federal district courts jurisdiction
61
over certain claims, had also “been enacted on the understanding that the
common law would provide a cause of action for [a] modest number of
62
international law violations.” Thus, the question before the Court in Kiobel was
“not whether petitioners have stated a proper claim under the ATS, but whether a
63
claim may reach conduct occurring in the territory of a foreign sovereign.”
Analysis of this issue, the Court concluded, was “constrain[ed]” by the
64
presumption against extraterritoriality. Further, the Court found, the
65
presumption could not be overcome in this case. Reviewing evidence
contemporary to the ATS’s enactment, the Court found that it “provide[d] no
support for the proposition that Congress expected causes of action to be brought
66
under the statute for violations of the law of nations occurring abroad.”
Kiobel is significant not only for cementing the Court’s reliance on the
67
presumption, but for the narrow view it took of the notion of “territory” itself.
Kiobel itself concerned events that had clearly occurred outside U.S. territory—
the alleged conduct at issue concerned events in Nigeria and had presumably
68
occurred either there or in the corporations’ home countries. Yet Kiobel also
offered some speculation about what conduct might be sufficiently tied to the
69
United States to become subject to the ATS’s reach. The Court noted that “even
where . . . claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must
do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662 (2013).
Id.
Id. at 1662-63.
See generally Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
Id. at 739.
Id. at 724.
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664.
Id. at 1665.
Id.
Id. at 1666.
Id. at 1669.
Id. (“On these facts, all the relevant conduct took place outside the United States.”).
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
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application.” Justice Robert’s use of the term “touch and concern” is striking
here, suggesting a literal, physical view of territory that is one not of a sovereign
71
but of a landowner. As the following section will discuss, this literal
understanding of territory is quite alien to the state choice-of-law context, which
focuses on state interests rather than a literal view of state power’s territorial
72
reach.
Kiobel may be said to divorce further the presumption against
extraterritoriality from an analysis that focuses on international norms or broader
jurisdictional questions. As the following section will discuss, this widens the
gap between federal and state approaches in both a practical way and a doctrinal
73
one. From a practical perspective, the strictness of the presumption, in contrast
to the relative liberality of many state approaches, means that in many cases with
74
foreign elements, state law will apply where federal law does not. Doctrinally,
the presumption focuses narrowly on legislative intent and on an old-fashioned
75
and formalistic view of territory, neither of which is of much use to state courts,
which deal substantially in judge-made law and cannot escape the reality of cases
with complex multijurisdictional contacts.
III. STATE CONFLICTS PRINCIPLES AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY
In contrast to the federal context, the law of extraterritoriality in most states
is strikingly underdeveloped. In state courts, concerns that fall under the rubric of
extraterritoriality in the federal context are typically addressed through the
76
normal state choice-of-law process. For the most part, that process lacks a
77
mechanism for taking into account extraterritoriality concerns.
In some ways, it is difficult to generalize about state choice-of-law
approaches. As a result of the mid-twentieth century choice-of-law “revolution,”
78
state choice-of-law methodologies are extremely diverse. A handful of states
adhere to traditional territorial approaches that require courts to look to a single
79
localizing factor, such as the place of injury in a tort case. Many states use some
form of governmental interest analysis, which looks to the degree to which
applying a particular decisional rule will further the policies motivating that

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See infra Part III.
73. See infra Part III.
74. Florey, supra note 5, at 538.
75. Id. at 542.
76. Id. at 537.
77. Id. at 560.
78. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2012: Twenty-Sixth Annual
Survey, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 217, 278 (2013) (presenting table summarizing state approaches).
79. See id.
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rule. The largest group of states follows the approach of the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws, a multifactor framework that incorporates a bit of
81
each of these methods. For all their differences, however, many choice-of-law
82
systems have common features: a preference for forum law, some consideration
83
of whether any potentially involved jurisdiction has an “interest” in the dispute,
and a general policy of flexibility that necessarily entails some judicial
84
discretion.
Further, state choice-of-law methodologies almost universally treat other85
state and non-U.S. law identically. As one commenter has observed, for
example, under the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws, “it does not matter
whether the choice is between the law of New York and New Hampshire or
86
between the law of New York and New Guinea.” The same tends to be true of
87
other methods. Indeed, many of the foundational cases of the choice-of-law
revolution dealt with conflicts between the law of a U.S. state and that of a
Canadian province, with little or no consideration of how the international
88
dimension might shape the issues involved.
From a historical perspective, states’ lack of focus on extraterritoriality
89
concerns is understandable. Modern choice-of-law doctrines evolved primarily
to deal with relatively minor conflicts with sister states (or Canadian provinces)
90
such as guest statutes and inter-spousal immunity. Their architects were
concerned with avoiding arbitrariness, manipulation, and unpredictable results—
91
not with navigating clashes of values between jurisdictions. Thus, state conflicts
principles were never developed with an eye to navigating the more serious

80. See id. at 278-80. One version of governmental interest analysis is California’s comparative
impairment methodology. See infra Part IV.
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971). In addition to the choice-of-law
theories discussed, a handful of states follow their own idiosyncratic methods. See Florey, supra note 5, at 556.
82. See Florey, supra note 5, at 553.
83. See id. at 555.
84. See id. at 539, 554-58 (summarizing some common features of most state choice-of-law regimes).
85. Id. at 537.
86. Id. at 560.
87. See infra Part IV (discussing various California cases).
88. E.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284 (N.Y. 1963). One of the earliest cases to abandon the
traditional First Restatement choice-of-law methodology, involved a conflict between the law of New York and
the law of Ontario. The majority found that New York law should apply despite the fact that the case arose out
of an accident in Ontario. Id. at 284-85. Interestingly, the dissent criticized the majority for resorting to “a form
of extraterritoriality.” See id. at 286-87 (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting).
89. See generally Friedrich K. Juenger, Symposium: Conflict of Laws and Complex Litigation Issues in
Mass Tort Litigation: Mass Disasters and the Conflict of Laws, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 105 (1989).
90. One scholar, for example, has criticized conflicts doctrine as excessively concerned with such
“humdrum mishaps as a collision on an interstate highway.” See id. at 105.
91. See Lea Brilmayer & Raechel Anglin, Choice of Law Theory and the Metaphysics of the Stand-Alone
Trigger, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1125, 1136-37 (2010).
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differences on regulatory policy and other issues that may attend disputes with
92
foreign elements.
Perhaps an even more difficult problem, however, is that much state law
remains common law. To the extent that federal extraterritoriality doctrines have
focused on legislative intent, they provide little guidance to state courts in such
93
cases. For this reason, federal cases applying the presumption against
extraterritoriality are arguably less helpful to state courts than earlier cases that
94
focused on questions of comity and extrajurisdictionality (that is, assertions of
95
U.S. law in violation of international norms) in ascertaining the proper reach of
federal law abroad. State courts generally have not relied on federal case law in
96
deciding conflicts cases, but the principles such cases articulated held at least
97
the potential to be transferrable to scenarios that state courts confront. By

92. See generally id.
93. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204-05 (1993) (suggesting that the presumption
against extraterritoriality caused the Court to arrive at the “same conclusion that the 79th Congress would have
reached had it expressly considered the question we now decide”). Earlier anti-extrajurisdictionality doctrines
likewise focused on legislative intent in the sense that they could be overcome by a clear statement of
Congress’s wishes. See Knox, supra note 19, at 361.
94. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 613-15 (9th Cir. 1976). Timberlane
Lumber Co. was widely influential in announcing a number of comity-based factors (which came to be called
the “Timberlane factors”) that courts should consider in determining whether a federal statute (the Sherman
Act) should be applied abroad. Id. Among the factors the Ninth Circuit considered were:
[T]he degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the
locations or principal places of businesses or corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either
state can be expected to achieve compliance, the relative significance of effects on the United States
as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect
American commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative importance to the violations
charged of conduct within the United States as compared with conduct abroad.
Id. at 614. The Supreme Court, however, has diverged from the Ninth Circuit’s framework. While not explicitly
overruling Timberlane Lumber Co., the Court took a strikingly different approach in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993) (holding that comity factors need not come into play so long as foreign
conduct produced a “substantial effect” in the United States). And “a person subject to regulation by two states
[could] comply with the laws of both.” Id. at 799 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
95. See Knox, supra note 19, at 360-61 (advocating canon of interpreting the extraterritorial reach of
statutes based on “international limits of jurisdiction,” and citing case law taking this approach); id. at 362-66
(discussing early case law applying a presumption against extrajurisdictionality).
96. For example, as of August 2013, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Timberlane Lumber Co. had been
cited in nearly 200 opinions available on Westlaw, but only once by a state court, and not by that court for any
comity-related proposition. See UFJ Bank Ltd. v. Ieda, 123 P.3d 1232, 1239 (Haw. 2005) (citing Timberlane
Lumber for the proposition that forum non conveniens may apply only when venue is proper).
97. For example, the comity-based Timberlane factors focus on the practical effect and foreign-relations
consequences of applying American law abroad, not on legislative intent. See Brilmayer & Anglin, supra note
91, at 1136-37. Interestingly, Hannah Buxbaum has pointed out that the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law, which sought to take an international rather than purely domestic perspective on the subject of
extraterritorial regulation, was influenced by the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, suggesting a
potential avenue for mutual influence between state and federal extraterritoriality approaches. See Hannah L.
Buxbaum, Territory, Territoriality, and the Resolution of Jurisdictional Conflict, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 631, 649
(2009). The Third Restatement, however, has generally been seen as “simply aspirational,” failing to “reflect
U.S. understanding or practice regarding the limits of legislative jurisdiction.” See id.
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contrast, the current articulation of the presumption against extraterritoriality has
98
far more limited relevance to state courts.
To be sure, cases like Aramco and Morrison have not completely lacked
99
influence in state courts. In rare cases, some state courts have borrowed from
federal extraterritoriality cases in interpreting the reach of state statutes outside
100
state borders.
This borrowing, however, has obvious limits. First, a
presumption against extraterritoriality, insofar as it is modeled on the federal one,
can only be applied to state statutory law; courts thus have little guidance in more
routine choice-of-law situations involving the applicability of state common
101
law. Second, many of the state decisions that look to federal doctrine deal with
state statutes that closely map federal ones, to which the presumption against
102
extraterritoriality has already been applied. In many cases in which more statespecific statutes are at issue, state courts tend to analyze them through ordinary
choice-of-law methods without recourse to the presumption against
103
extraterritoriality.
In sum, traditional state conflicts principles do little to constrain the
extraterritorial application of state law. Further, although the Supreme Court has

98. Arguably, Kiobel bridges the divide to some degree in the sense that the Alien Tort Statute, which it
interprets, is a jurisdictional statute; substantive causes of action under the statute must be based on common
law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (granting federal district courts “original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States”). The Court in
Kiobel thus worried about the foreign policy consequences that might ensue when “a cause of action under the
ATS reaches conduct within the territory of another sovereign.” See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 133 S.
Ct. 1659, 1665 (2013). At the same time, in considering whether the presumption had been overcome, the Court
focused exclusively on the statutory “text, history, and purposes” of the ATS, not on more general comity or
foreign-policy concerns. Id.
99. See, e.g., Abel v. Planning and Zoning Comm’n of New Canaan, 998 A.2d 1149, 1154-55 (Conn.
2010).
100. Richard D. Bernstein et al., Closing Time: You Don’t Have to Go Home, But You Can’t Stay Here,
67 BUS. LAW. 957, 969 (2012) (noting that “many state courts apply a similar test to Morrison to presume that
state statutes do not apply extraterritorially”). To some extent, this trend pre-dated Morrison. See Abel, 998
A.2d at 1154-55 (noting that “[m]any state courts have applied this principle [the presumption against
extraterritoriality] to state statutes” and citing several cases to do so).
101. Bernstein et al., supra note 100, at 969.
102. Thus, for example, courts interpreting state employment discrimination standards appear particularly
likely to apply the Court’s opinion in Aramco. See, e.g., Union Underwear Co. v. Barnhart, 50 S.W.3d 188,
190-92 (Ky. 2001) (relying on part on Aramco to find that Kentucky state anti-discrimination statute did not
apply to conduct outside Kentucky); see, e.g., Judkins v. Saint Joseph’s College of Maine, 483 F. Supp. 2d 60,
65-66 (D. Me. 2007) (reaching similar result with respect to similar Maine law); see, e.g., Blackman v. Lincoln
Nat’l Corp., No. 10-6946, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175021, at *4-5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2012) (same with respect
to Pennsylvania law). Note that “extraterritorial” in this context has generally referred to the operation of state
statutes outside state territory (i.e., in sister states) rather than outside the United States. Similarly, state courts
interpreting state RICO statutes have followed federal case law on the issue. See, e.g., El Instituto Costarricense
de Electricidad v. Alcatel-Lucent (S.A.), No. 10-25859 CA 13 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Jan. 18, 2011) (order),
discussed in Bernstein et al., supra note 100, at 969.
103. See Caleb Nelson, State and Federal Models of the Interaction between Statutes and Unwritten Law,
80 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 665-70 (2013) (discussing the “presumption that [a] state’s statutes accommodate[s] the
state’s normal choice-of-law rules”).
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restricted the extent to which federal law applies abroad, it has done so in a way
that has little relevance to state courts and is thus likely to be of fairly limited
influence on them.
IV. CALIFORNIA: AN EXTRATERRITORIALITY TEST CASE
To consider how state rules and standards may often operate
extraterritorially, it is worth considering the example of California. California is a
useful test case both because it is a large state and because its courts hear many
104
disputes with foreign elements. In choice-of-law cases, California makes use of
105
a “comparative impairment” approach, a form of governmental interest analysis
106
107
pioneered by William Baxter that has attracted both praise and criticism.
Engaging in a full comparative impairment analysis is normally a three-step
process: First, the court determines whether any relevant difference exists in the
108
laws of any “potentially affected” jurisdiction. Second, if a difference exists,
the court determines whether each such jurisdiction has any interest in the
109
application of its law. Finally, if more than one jurisdiction does have such an
interest, the court must “‘determine which state’s interest would be more
110
impaired if its policy were subordinated to the policy of the other state.’”
111
Like many choice-of-law regimes, California’s version of governmental
112
interest analysis has a built-in forum bias. Courts applying California choiceof-law principles have generally held that forum (i.e., California) law applies as
the default and that the party advocating for the application of foreign law must
113
affirmatively make the case that California law should be displaced. Hurtado v.

104. See Jorge A. Vargas, The Emerging Presence of Mexican Law in California Courts, 7 SAN DIEGO
INT’L L.J. 215, 217-18 (2005) (noting that California courts decided more than 200 cases involving foreign law
over a two-year period and suggesting that foreign-law cases will become even more significant part of
California courts’ docket).
105. See e.g., McCann v. Foster Wheeler LLC, 225 P.3d 516 (Cal. 2010).
106. See William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 18 (1963).
107. For a review of the literature both criticizing and defending comparative impairment, see Lili Levi,
The Problem of Trans-National Libel, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 507, 541 (2012) (acknowledging comparative
impairment’s critics but suggesting it might be a useful way to think about “libel tourism” cases). Mark Rosen,
for example, suggests that relying on comparative impairment in the international context is potentially
problematic because it requires courts to balance incommensurable interests and pronounce on matters that the
executive and legislative branches are perhaps better suited to assess. Mark D. Rosen, Should “Un-American”
Foreign Judgments Be Enforced?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 783, 818-19 (2004). Nonetheless, Rosen concludes that
these “challenges to international comparative impairment may not be devastating,” because courts in fact have
shown some competency in addressing similar issues in the domestic context. See id. at 817.
108. Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 39 Cal. 4th 95, 107 (2006).
109. Id. at 107-08.
110. Id. at 108.
111. See, e.g., Florey, supra note 5, at 537.
112. See, e.g., Hurtado v. Superior Court of Sacramento, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 581 (1974).
113. Id.
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114

Superior Court, for example, suggests that California law applies unless a party
“timely invokes the law of a foreign state” and “demonstrate[s] that the latter rule
115
of decision will further the interest of the foreign state.” The case for foreign
law rather than California law may fail at any of the three steps described above:
the court may determine that the content of foreign law does not differ from
116
California law, that the foreign jurisdiction lacks an interest in applying its
117
law, or that the foreign jurisdiction’s interest would be less impaired than
118
California’s if its policy were “subordinated.”
While this general framework applies in both foreign-nation and sister-state
119
cases, the forum bias is, if anything, sometimes accentuated in foreign-nation
cases. It is reasonable to assume that courts generally have more difficulty
ascertaining the content or purposes of a foreign nation’s law than they do sisterstate law. Thus, the forum-law default may be more likely to apply in foreign-law
120
cases. In Sommer v. Gabor, for example, a California court upheld the
121
application of forum law to a defamation claim arising in Germany. The case,
at first glance, had significant ties to Germany: the plaintiff was a German-born
122
actress (Elke Sommer) with a reputation that “crosse[d] the ocean.” Sommer
sued Zsa Zsa Gabor and her husband for allegedly defamatory comments made
by Gabor in German to a German journalist while Gabor was staying in a
114. Id.
115. See Hill v. Novartis Pharmaceutical Corp., No. 1:06-cv-00939-AWI-DLB, 2012 WL 967577, at *1
(E.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2012) (“The law of the forum . . . will be displaced only if there is a compelling reason for
doing so.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted); see Marsh v. Burrell, 805 F. Supp. 1493, 1498 (N.D. Cal.
1992) (“[California] choice of law analysis embodies the presumption that California law applies unless the
proponent of foreign law can show otherwise”); see Browne v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 504 F. Supp. 514,
517 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (“Under the government interest analysis, California will apply its own law unless it is
shown that there is a compelling reason to displace forum law.”). Cf. Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil
Co., 22 Cal.3d 157, 163 n.5 (1978) (suggesting that this principle is not interpreted rigidly, and that courts may
take judicial notice of foreign law).
116. See, e.g., Rivera v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 217 Cal. App. 3d 294, 298 (1st Dist. 1990)
(“no true conflict of law” existed where two jurisdiction’s laws were “reasonably identical” and thus California
law applied as forum law).
117. See Washington Mutual Bank, FA v. Superior Court of Orange County, 24 Cal. 4th 906, 920 (2001)
(the court “may properly find California law applicable without proceeding to the third step in the analysis if the
foreign law proponent fails . . . establish the other state’s interest in having its own law applied”).
118. See, e.g., Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 39 Cal. 4th 95, 128 (concluding that California
law should apply to most issues in the case because “the interests of California would be severely impaired if its
law were not applied in this context, whereas Georgia’s interest would not be significantly impaired if
California law rather than Georgia law were applied”).
119. See, e.g., id. at 100 (applying interest analysis/comparative impairment framework to conflict
between California and Georgia law); Hurtado v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 579-80
(1974) (applying similar framework to conflict between law of California and of Mexico).
120. “This is the case because forum law applies by default unless “the proponent of foreign law can
show otherwise.” Marsh, 805 F. Supp. at 1496. Such a showing generally involves both establishing a
difference between foreign law and California law and making the case that any such difference creates an
interest on the part of the foreign jurisdiction. See id. at 1497.
121. Sommer v. Gabor, 40 Cal. App. 4th 1455, 1469-70 (2d Dist. 1995).
122. Id. at 1463.
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123

124

German hotel and by Gabor’s husband to a German journalist. In both cases,
the allegedly defamatory remarks had been published in German-language
125
publications. Nonetheless, in large part because of uncertainty about German
law’s content, the court found the lower court’s application of California law
(under which plaintiff had recovered a total of $3.3 million against both
126
defendants) to be proper. As the court noted, “[t]he snippets and portions of
German case law cited by appellants are simply not adequate for us to make any
meaningful conclusions regarding the result of applying German law to the
instant case,” far less to determine Germany’s interest in applying its law under
127
the circumstances. Absent such a showing, the court found that forum—i.e.,
128
California—law should apply under governmental interest analysis.
Even where the content of foreign law is clear, courts applying California
law sometimes take a restrictive view of what counts as an “interest” on the part
of the foreign jurisdiction. Consider, for example, the case of damages. In a
variety of cases, courts applying California law have found that non-California
jurisdictions that limit either compensatory or punitive damages have no interest
129
in applying those limits unless the defendant is resident there, even when the
130
conduct at issue occurred in the foreign jurisdiction.
The first two stages, then, tend to have a tilt, either implicit or explicit, in
favor of forum law. The third stage, in which courts assess which jurisdiction’s
interests would be more impaired if its law were not applied, is perhaps more of
an equal contest; California courts have chosen non-California law over forum
131
law with some frequency. In these cases, however, analysis is sometimes fact132
specific and unpredictable.
123. Id. at 1461-62.
124. Id. at 1462-63.
125. Id. at 1461.
126. Id. at 1463-64.
127. Sommer, 40 Cal. App. 4th at 1469.
128. See id. at 1470; see also Washington Mutual Bank, FA v. Superior Court of Orange County, 24 Cal.
4th 906, 919 (2001) (explaining that “the foreign law proponent must identify the applicable rule of law in each
potentially concerned state and must show it materially differs from the law of California”).
129. See, e.g., Pecover v. Electronic Arts Inc., No. C 08-2820 VRW, 2010 WL 8742757, at *61 (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 21, 2010); see, e.g., Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. C 99-02506 SI, 2006 WL 2455761, at *8-*9 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 22, 2006); see, e.g., Bauer v. Club Med Sales Inc., No. C-95-1637 MHP, 1996 WL 310076, at *17
(N.D. Cal. May 22, 1996); see, e.g., Marsh v. Burrell, 805 F. Supp. 1493, 1498 (N.D. Cal. 1992); see, e.g.,
Hurtado v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 583 (1974).
130. See, e.g., Bowoto, 2006 WL 2455761, at *10 (noting that conduct at issue occurred primarily within
Nigerian borders); see, e.g., Bauer, 1996 WL 310076, at *6 (noting that “the acts giving rise to the action
occurred in a foreign country”). In at least one case, a court applying California choice-of-law principles applied
the California law of punitive damages notwithstanding the fact that the defendant was a resident of New
Jersey, which limited damages. See Hill v. Novartis Pharmaceutical Corp., No. 1:06-cv-00939-AWI-DLB, 2012
WL 967577, at *0-10 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2012).
131. See, e.g., Herma Hill Kay, The Use of Comparative Impairment to Resolve True Conflicts: An
Evaluation of the California Experience, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 577, 607 (1980) (noting that, under comparative
impairment analysis, California courts applied foreign law rather than California law in three of four prominent
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The often forum-law-friendly environment of California courts has already
attracted the notice of foreign plaintiffs, and is likely to do so even more
133
frequently in the wake of Morrison and Kiobel. An instructive recent case is
134
Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., a Ninth Circuit case applying California conflicts
law that has received particular attention in the wake of the Kiobel decision. The
case alleged that Chevron, acting through a subsidiary, had paid for a “series of
135
brutal attacks” on plaintiffs while they were engaged in political protests.
136
Plaintiffs alleged several California tort-law claims. To all issues besides the
137
plaintiffs’ wrongful-death claim, the court applied California law.
The court’s reasons for applying California law were diverse. As to
plaintiffs’ assault and battery and negligence claims, the court found that
Nigerian law did not materially differ from California law and thus California
138
law applied. As to plaintiffs’ survival actions, the court found that while
Nigeria’s law differed from California’s (Nigeria, unlike California, did not allow
139
punitive damages), Nigeria lacked an interest and thus California law applied.
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the established California choiceof-law principle that “limitations of liability, as opposed to exposure to tort
140
liability, are false conflicts when the defendant is a non-resident corporation.”
With respect to the causes of action plaintiffs had stated for intentional and
negligent infliction of emotional distress, loss of consortium, and civil
conspiracy, the court found that a material difference existed: California
141
recognized these claims, while Nigeria did not. Further, the court found this
difference to create a true conflict in which both jurisdictions had an interest in
142
having their law applied. But in proceeding to comparative impairment
analysis, the court found that California’s interest would be the more impaired if

cases).
132. Many scholars have noted the danger that the somewhat subjective nature of comparative
impairment analysis will lead to unpredictable results. See Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 277, 318 (1990) (noting that “actual cases decided under comparative impairment analysis”
illustrate the fact that it requires judgments that are “too subjective and too complex”).
133. See generally, e.g., Bowoto, 2006 WL 2455761.
134. See generally id.
135. Id. at *1.
136. Plaintiffs stated claims for wrongful death, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent
infliction of emotional distress, loss of consortium, civil conspiracy, assault and battery, negligence, and
survival actions. Id. at *7-9.
137. See id. Interestingly, the court applied Nigerian law to the wrongful death claim based on earlier
cases that, relying on American Banana and the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws (since abandoned by
California), suggested that California’s wrongful death statute did not apply outside the state’s borders. See
Gordon v. Reynolds, 187 Cal. App. 2d 472, 476-77 (1961).
138. See Bowoto, 2006 WL 245576, at *9.
139. See id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at *8.
142. Id. at *9.
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its law were not applied. California had an interest in regulating the conduct of
corporations operating within its borders, while Nigeria’s interest in “defining its
tort law” did not legitimately extend to “depriving plaintiffs of a mechanism to
143
recover for allegedly brutal attacks.” Thus, even though it was a “close
144
question,” California law applied to these claims as well.
145
The case ultimately proceeded to a jury verdict, which Chevron won. Thus,
Chevron was not in the end required to pay damages under California law.
Nonetheless, Bowoto illustrates both the way in which international human rights
claims may be reframed in the terms of state tort law (notably, the plaintiffs had
stated federal claims under the Alien Tort Statute and Torture Victim Protection
146
Act alongside their state-law claims) and the more general potential for broad
147
applicability of state law to conduct abroad.
The experience of California is important because it shows both that
plaintiffs have often succeeded in bringing claims with substantial forum
elements in state court and that choice-of-law principles have often dictated the
148
applicability of forum law in such circumstances. Further, there is reason to
think that California is more similar to, rather than different from, other states in
149
this regard. Most state choice-of-law systems, for example, exhibit some
150
preference for forum law, and in general state conflicts principles, including the
151
Second Restatement applied by a large plurality of states, do not treat foreign
152
and sister-state law differently in conflicts analysis.
From a policy standpoint, the potential availability of state-law claims has
the potential for both good and bad consequences. On the one hand, the possible
applicability of state law may provide the only available avenue of redress to
human rights victims, those injured by corporate fraud, and other sympathetic
plaintiffs. On the other hand, the widespread use of state courts and state law in
disputes with foreign elements raises legitimate concerns about forum153
shopping, difficulty anticipating which sovereign’s standards will govern
143. See id. at *10.
144. Bowoto, 2006 WL 2455761 at *10.
145. See Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010).
146. See Bowoto, 2006 WL 2455761 at *11.
147. The attacks had been ordered and carried out in Nigeria, although plaintiffs alleged that they had
been “approved and later ratified in California.” Id. at *10.
148. Much commentary has focused on potential obstacles plaintiffs face in bringing claims with
substantial foreign elements in state courts. See, e.g., Childress, supra note 4, at 741-52. The nature and severity
of obstacles plaintiffs face depends, of course, on what sort of claims they are trying to bring and how
substantial the foreign elements are.
149. See Florey, supra note 5, at 537.
150. Id.
151. See Symeonides, supra note 78, at 278-79.
152. See Reimann, supra note 9, at 576-77.
153. In Morrison, for example, Justice Scalia invoked worries that the United States might become a
“Shangri-La” for foreign securities plaintiffs. See Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869,
2877-78 (2010).
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155

particular conduct, and inappropriate projection of state power. But
regardless of where one thinks the balance should be struck, a strong argument
exists that the issue of state-law applicability to foreign disputes should be made
part of discussions of both the federal presumption against extraterritoriality and
to the merits (or lack thereof) of the current state choice-of-law framework when
applied in the international context. The next section discusses this point in more
156
detail.
V. THE FUTURE: RECONCILING THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST
EXTRATERRITORIALITY WITH STATE APPROACHES
A. What the Presumption Means (and Does Not Mean) for States
The Court’s recent revival of interest in the presumption against
extraterritoriality offers little to guide states in their choice-of-law decision
making processes. To begin, the Court’s expansion of the presumption suggests
that it has abandoned an approach to extraterritoriality grounded in comity and
157
international norms in favor of one rooted entirely in statutory interpretation.
Whatever might be said for or against this shift more generally, it suggests that
state courts applying predominantly common law will find little in the Court’s
recent case law to guide them.
This is not for lack of interest or concern on the part of state courts, which
have often earnestly attempted to follow the Court’s extraterritoriality approach
158
to the extent that they can. But, because of their focus on statutes, Morrison or
Kiobel shed little light on the question of how far state law should extend when
no legislative intent exists about which to make presumptions.
The divergence in the applicability of federal and state law raises a number
of obvious problems. As a starting point, the potentially greater applicability of
state (as opposed to federal) law abroad creates a strong likelihood that disputes
with foreign elements will increasingly be governed by state-law standards,
whether in state or federal court. Because both state substantive law and state
choice-of-law principles are quite diverse, this phenomenon in turn increases
uncertainty about the potential legal consequences of foreign conduct and
undermines what Anthony Colangelo has called “spatial legality”—the due
process principle that conduct that is legal in the jurisdiction where it is
154. See Colangelo, supra note 14, at 75 (describing the issue of “retrospective alteration of rules
subjecting parties to a law they could not have expected would govern their conduct”).
155. See Florey, supra note 5, at 571.
156. See infra Part V.
157. See Knox, supra note 19, at 352. This is true to a great extent even in Kiobel, where the Court raised
some foreign policy and comity concerns but ultimately treated the question at hand as one largely of statutory
interpretation. See supra note 98.
158. See Bernstein et al., supra note 100, at 969.
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undertaken should not be subject to unforeseeable legal consequences in a distant
159
place.
In addition to due process concerns, the greater reach of state law raises both
questions about the inappropriate projection of U.S. power and concerns about
160
federalism. States currently enjoy nearly unlimited power under the U.S.
Constitution to apply their law to disputes so long as they have at least a few
161
modest connections to the case. A state determined to apply its law to a
162
predominantly foreign dispute would face few external checks on its doing so.
Yet such a result could have potentially serious consequences for U.S. foreign
relations. State power applied abroad is likely to be seen by other nations as U.S.
power in a different form, and for that reason the application of state law abroad
raises (at a minimum) the same concerns as those present where federal law is
concerned.
Further, such application of state law may directly interfere with deliberate
decisions by Congress to exercise restraint in how broadly to apply a parallel
federal law abroad. For this reason, some scholars have suggested that a
preemption principle may, in some circumstances, limit the applicability of state
163
164
law abroad. Such a principle, however, finds little support in case law and
(particularly where state common law is concerned) is in considerable tension
with states’ historical freedom to select their preferred conflicts principles
165
without federal interference.
Finally, a shift in cases with foreign elements from federal court and federal
law to state court and state law lays bare some of the conceptual limitations of
state choice-of-law methodology. It is hard to defend an approach that treats
identically, on the one hand, a major difference in law reflecting serious policy
divisions between two countries and, on the other, a minor difference in sister-

159. See Colangelo, supra note 14, at 72-73. Of course, this concern does not by itself dictate any
particular interpretation of the territorial scope of state law. It certainly does not mean that such law may never
apply to conduct or actors outside the borders of the United States. It simply means that, when state law is
applied extraterritorially, it should be done so in a way that is guided by consistent and relatively predictable
principles.
160. See Florey, supra note 5, at 571.
161. States, that is, are limited in their ability to apply their law to a particular dispute only by the modest
constraints imposed by the Due Process Clause. See id. at 557.
162. This is not at all to say that such practices are common; many state courts, indeed, are sensitive to
concerns about projecting state law into the foreign arena, and make use of many devices (such as forum non
conveniens and the personal jurisdiction “reasonableness” inquiry) to exercise restraint. See id. at 561. Indeed,
one could argue that the lack of guidance available to state courts results in a suboptimal degree of application
of state law to foreign disputes, since state courts in marginal cases may err on the side of restraint.
163. See Childress, supra note 4, at 749-50 (exploring various preemption theories).
164. See id. at 749 (“Few decisions have held state laws unconstitutional on the grounds that they impact
the federal government’s exercise of foreign affairs.”).
165. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 727-28 (1988) (noting that states may permissibly
apply a variety of choice-of-law principles and expressing wariness about the “enterprise of constitutionalizing
choice-of-law rules, with no compass to guide us beyond our own perceptions of what seems desirable”).
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state laws such as which insurance policies can be used to provide compensation
166
for a motorcycle accident. To the extent that states wish their choice-of-law
regimes to be fair, effective, and coherent, they will have to adapt them to this
167
new reality.
Such adaptation, however, should go beyond simply mimicking recent
developments in federal extraterritoriality principles. It would be a mistake, that
is, for state courts to take the restrictive approach to the applicability of U.S. law
abroad that underlies the presumption against extraterritoriality.
To begin with, the central justification for the presumption against
extraterritoriality is that it accords with legislative intent. As the Court opined,
applying the presumption against extraterritoriality to the Federal Tort Claims
Act in Smith v. United States, it believed its result to be the “same conclusion that
the 79th Congress would have reached had it expressly considered the question
168
we now decide.” Similarly, the Court’s analysis in Kiobel focused almost
entirely on events surrounding the passage of the Alien Tort Statute in an attempt
169
to discern Congress’s intent as to its territorial reach.
To the extent congressional intent is the primary justification for the
presumption against extraterritoriality, the presumption should not apply to state
common law. Arguably, it should not apply to state statutory law either. Given
that states’ economies and overall welfare are highly interconnected, the
“perception that [the legislature] ordinarily legislates with respect to domestic,
170
not foreign matters,”
which underpins the presumption against
extraterritoriality, is a far less plausible assumption in the state context, at least
171
where applicability of state law to sister states is at issue. Further, the fact that
Congress may legislatively override the presumption, and has in fact done so,
172
mitigates its strictness in the federal context. Though similar overrides by state
legislatures are of course possible, the sheer scope of state statutory and common

166. This was the question at issue in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 305 (1981), one of the
principal cases in which the Supreme Court has discussed the constitutional limits on state choice-of-law
decisions. Such differences may, of course, be highly meaningful to the litigants in a particular case, but they
have few long-term policy implications. Moreover, many such disputes involve national businesses that can
certainly predict and plan for the fact that they will be likely held to account in multiple states that may apply
somewhat different legal regimes to them.
167. Of course, given the controversy that has long attended the development of state choice-of-law
principles even in the wholly domestic context, however, any such adaptation is likely to be a complex and
fraught process.
168. Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204-05 (1993).
169. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659, 1665-69 (2013).
170. Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010).
171. Indeed, routine application of state conflicts principles produces results that might be characterized
as “extraterritorial.” See Katherine Florey, State Courts, State Territory, State Power: Reflections on the
Extraterritoriality Principle in Choice of Law and Legislation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1074 (2009).
Because this effect of choice-of-law decisions is a long-standing one, state legislatures can likely be presumed,
at least in many circumstances, to have acted against its backdrop.
172. See Florey, supra note 5, at 550.
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law makes it unreasonable to think state legislatures could take action to clarify
the scope of every state legal rule that might conceivably apply outside state
borders.
Yet if the presumption against extraterritoriality is likely to be of little use to
state courts, earlier federal cases that grappled with broader issues of
extraterritoriality may, by contrast, provide valuable guidance. John Knox has
identified various presumptions against extrajurisdictionality that federal courts
173
historically applied in interpreting the reach of federal law; such principles
seem of equal relevance when applied to state statutes that may be applied
abroad. Likewise, principles of comity, as articulated in cases like Timberlane
Lumber, provide an untapped source of guidance for state courts negotiating
174
state-law/foreign-law conflicts. Reliance on such principles may not, of course,
be a full solution to the problem, but they could at least provide a starting point
for the development of a body of doctrine that recognizes the distinct issues
175
posed by conflicts between state and foreign-nation law.
B. State Conflict Doctrine’s Relevance to the Interpretation of Federal Statutes
The previous section argued that state courts negotiating state-law/foreign176
law conflicts should take more account of federal precedent. While a full
discussion of the federal presumption against extraterritoriality is beyond the
scope of this brief Article, it is nonetheless worth noting that the case for
increased dialogue between federal and state approaches applies to federal law as
well. In other words, the potential substitution of state law for federal law in
disputes with foreign elements should also guide federal courts as they apply the
presumption against extraterritoriality.
The phenomenon of state-law replacement of federal law abroad undermines
to some degree the justifications the Court has articulated for the presumption

173. See Knox, supra note 19, at 362-66. Knox suggests a modern framework rooted in this early case
law and in current international norms, under which
If [such norms] allocate the United States sole or primary legislative jurisdiction, then the court
would have a green light to construe the statute without any presumption against its application. If
the United States does not have sole or primary jurisdiction, but international law does provide it
with some basis for jurisdiction, then the light would turn yellow: the court would employ a soft
presumption against application of the statute that could be overcome by an indication of legislative
intent that it do so. Finally, if the United States has no basis under international law for jurisdiction,
the light would be red.
Id. at 396. Again, this framework is highly adaptable to the state context as well. For a related argument that
international relations concerns should guide courts in determining whether the presumption against
extraterritoriality is triggered in the first instance, see Franklin A. Gevurtz, Determining Extraterritoriality, 56
WILL. & MARY L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2014).
174. See Florey, supra note 5, at 575 n.245.
175. See id.
176. See supra Part V.A.
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against extraterritoriality. To the extent the presumption is designed to reflect
real-world congressional intent, it seems improbable that Congress would, in
178
general, desire state law to apply abroad to a greater extent than federal law.
Likewise, to the extent that the presumption is in part driven by the hope that it
179
and discourage forum-shopping, courts should
will foster predictability
consider the fact that the potential substitution of state law may make these
180
aspirations less likely to be achieved.
This tension between the phenomenon of state-law replacement of federal
law and the stated justifications for the presumption against extraterritoriality
should guide federal courts in applying the latter. To the extent the presumption’s
primary justification is that it reflects congressional intent, courts should take into
account the possibility that applying the presumption will result in state law
being substituted for foreign law and weigh that potential result in their
181
consideration of whether the presumption has been overcome. To the extent the
182
presumption is also justified by the Court’s policy worries, the possible
substitution of state law may also be relevant in ascertaining how broadly the
presumption should be applied.
Such effects do not make a comprehensive case against the presumption
against extraterritoriality, but they do perhaps counsel in favor of greater
selectivity and nuance in the way in which courts apply the presumption. At the

177. See Florey, supra note 5, at 566.
178. In other contexts, that is, we generally assume that issues touching upon foreign relations are the
domain of Congress, not the states. See Childress, supra note 4, at 749-50. We further assume that Congress
normally legislates because it wants to preempt or supplement state law; it seems reasonable that this intention
would not be limited to wholly domestic conduct. See Florey, supra note 5, at 566. One could argue that this
principle does not necessarily undermine the Court’s stated rationale for the presumption—the notion that
perception that “Congress ordinarily legislates with respect to domestic, not foreign matters.” See Morrison v.
National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2869 (2010). That is, it is completely plausible that, with respect
to any given piece of legislation, Congress intended that it only apply domestically and gave no consideration to
its possible overseas application or the possibility that state law might become the governing standard. At the
same time, a strong argument exists that our more general understanding of what areas Congress legislates in
(and why it does so) should inform our understanding of whether and how the presumption against
extraterritoriality should be applied.
179. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878 (criticizing extraterritoriality regimes not rooted in the presumption
as “complex in formulation and unpredictable in application”).
180. See id. at 2886 (noting danger that, without a strict limit on the extraterritorial application of federal
law, the United States might become “Shangri-La of class-action litigation for lawyers representing those
allegedly cheated in foreign securities markets”).
181. The Court has yet to clarify exactly what sort of evidence would suffice to overcome the
presumption. In Kiobel, however, the Court focused extensively not just on statutory language but on “the
historical background against which the [Alien Tort Statute] was enacted” to assess whether the presumption
had been overcome. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659, 1666 (2013). The Court’s
lengthy consideration of this issue suggests that the context in which Congress legislates may provide at least
some evidence of whether the presumption has been overcome.
182. See Kramer, supra note 132.
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very least, courts applying the presumption should do so with an understanding
183
of the potential state-law replacement effects they may be creating.
The substitution of state law for federal law also supports the case for
congressional action to clarify federal statutes’ extraterritorial reach. Through
explicit pronouncements, Congress has the power to overcome the presumption
184
against extraterritoriality. In cases where state law appears likely to apply to
foreign disputes, there is a particularly strong case for Congress to pass
legislation that would supply a more uniform federal standard. Such legislation,
depending on circumstances, might or might not be accompanied by a provision
explicitly preempting related state causes of action.
VI. CONCLUSION
State and federal approaches to law’s extraterritorial reach have long moved
along separate tracks, with states dealing with such issues (if at all) within the
rubric of their existing conflicts principles, while federal law has been subject to
185
a distinct body of doctrine regulating its extraterritorial reach. The Supreme
Court’s recent strengthening of the presumption against extraterritoriality has
186
only accentuated this divide. The Court has moved the doctrine of federal
extraterritoriality in a direction increasingly incompatible with state approaches,
while at the same time left a void that state law seems likely to fill at least in
187
part. This divergence has the potential to undermine predictability for foreign
actors and to upend the normal state-federal balance of power in matters touching
188
on foreign relations. This situation in turn calls upon both state and federal
courts to find ways to understand the interrelationship of state and federal
approaches and perhaps to reconcile them to some degree. Even as state and
federal approaches to extraterritoriality are moving in increasingly different
directions, both might be better served by greater dialogue and, ultimately,
greater convergence.

183. Justice Breyer, indeed, noted this potential in his brief Morrison concurrence, although it is not clear
if the majority took such issues into account. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2888. (Breyer, J., concurring)
(observing that “state law . . . may apply to the fraudulent activity alleged here to have occurred in the United
States”).
184. See, e.g., supra Part II.
185. See supra Parts II, III.
186. See supra Part V.A.
187. See supra Part V.B.
188. See supra Part V.B.
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